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Corporate Governance and Corporate Social Responsibility Disclosure: Evidence from 
the US Banking Sector 
ABSTRACT 
There is a distinct lack of research into the relationship between corporate governance and 
corporate social responsibility (CSR) in the banking sector. This paper fills the gap in the 
literature by examining the impact of corporate governance, with particular reference to the 
role of board of directors, on the quality of CSR disclosure in US listed banks’ annual reports 
after the US sub-prime mortgage crisis. Using a sample of large US commercial banks for the 
period 2009-2011 and controlling for audit committee characteristics, board meeting 
frequency, and banks’ profitability, size and risk, we find evidence that board independence 
and board size, the two board characteristics usually associated with the protection of 
shareholder interests, are positively related to CSR disclosure. This indicates that, with regard 
to CSR disclosure, more independent boards of directors and larger boards are the internal 
corporate governance mechanisms which promote both shareholders’ and other stakeholders’ 
interests. Contrary to our expectations, CEO duality also impacts positively on CSR 
disclosure. From an agency-theoretical viewpoint, this suggests that powerful CEOs may 
promote transparency about banks’ CSR activities for their private benefits. Given the 
increased risk awareness and aversion of banks’ key stakeholders, this finding might indicate 
that powerful CEOs are under particular pressure to appease stakeholders’ concerns, that they 
might abuse their power, by providing a high degree of CSR disclosure.  
Keywords: Corporate governance. CSR disclosure. US Banks. Content analysis. Financial 
crisis. 
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1. Introduction 
Financial institutions, in particular banks, have come under increasing pressure since the sub-
prime mortgage crisis and the following credit crunch to take a more long-term view of their 
investors’ business interests and to acknowledge and respond to their obligations to society 
(Matten, 2006; Money and Schepers, 2007; Gill, 2008; Grove, Patelli, Victoravich and Xu, 
2011). Due to the extensive negative external effects poorly managed and controlled banks 
can impose on society, the perception of the firms’ corporate social responsibility (CSR) 
activities is important not only for investors’ and customers’ risk assessment, but also for 
regulators’ good-will and for the public’s confidence in the financial system.  
Extensive prior research suggests that CSR reporting can impact positively on 
stakeholders’ perceptions of firm performance, firm value and firm risk, and thereby on 
firms’ profitability, cost of capital and share price (Gray, Kouhy and Lavers, 1995b; Simpson 
and Kohers, 2002; Scholtens, 2008; Godfrey, Merrill and Hansen, 2009; Salama, Anderson 
and Toms, 2011; Ghoul, Guedhami, Kwok and Mishra, 2011; Cormier, Ledoux and Magnan, 
2011; Lourenco, Branco, Curto and Eugenio, 2012). Moreover, as CSR reporting contributes 
to the reduction of information asymmetry between managers and investors as well as other 
stakeholders, comprehensive CSR reporting aids the supervision and control of managers. 
Effective boards of directors are therefore expected to promote CSR reporting (Jamali, 
Safieddine and Rabbath, 2008). 
Given the potential impact of CSR reporting on firms’ sustainability, there is a surprising 
dearth of research into the impact of corporate governance on CSR disclosure. Existing 
research mainly concentrates on the influence of CSR committees on CSR disclosure (Gill, 
2008; Spitzeck, 2009; Li, Fetscherin, Alon, Lattemann and Yeh, 2010; Kolk and Pinkse, 
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2010), and largely neglects investigating whether key characteristics of the board of directors 
impact on the reporting of CSR-related issues. As the board of directors is responsible for the 
development of sustainable business strategies and the supervision of the responsible use of 
the firms’ assets, it is the board, which takes the crucial decisions in relation to a firm’s CSR 
policies. If firms engage in CSR activities and reporting not merely as a temporary fad or to 
appease managers’ personal moral concerns (Porter and Kramer, 2006; Hennigfeld, Pohl and 
Tolhurst, 2006), but to acknowledge societal concerns and maintain positive relationships 
with key stakeholders in order to improve the sustainability of the business, one would expect 
that firms with more effective boards structures will be particularly diligent in providing 
information on CSR-related issues. Accordingly, and in light of increasing public, customer 
and investor pressures, corporate governance features, such as board characteristics, which 
were originally designed mainly to protect shareholder interests (Fama, 1980; Hermalin and 
Weisbach, 1998, 2003), might be effective in encouraging managerial stewardship for the 
benefit of a wide range of stakeholders.  
Understanding the link between corporate governance, in particular board characteristics, 
and CSR reporting is important for banks, because of their potential significant negative 
external effects on society. Since the credit crunch of 2007-2008, stakeholders’ perceptions of 
firms’ risk and performance have become particularly important to banks’ sustainability, 
since they rely on depositors and government agencies as key sources for funding and 
liquidity (Grove et al., 2011; Veronesi and Zingales, 2010), and as investors have become 
increasingly risk averse (Gemmill and Keswani, 2011). However, there is a distinct lack of 
empirical research into the relationship between corporate governance and CSR in the 
banking sector. This paper fills the gap in the literature by investigating whether corporate 
governance characteristics, in particular key features of the board of directors, impact on CSR 
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disclosure in US commercial banks’ annual reports, for the period after the credit crunch of 
2007-2008. We use banks’ annual reports, rather than CSR or corporate sustainability reports, 
because annual reports are the key documents scrutinised by a wide range of stakeholders 
(e.g. Toms, 2002; Campbell and Slack, 2008). Additionally disclosure of CSR-related 
information in annual reports allows boards to signal their balance between financial and 
social objectives (Gray, Kouhy and Lavers, 1995a). Unlike previous research into CSR 
disclosure, which relied on counting relevant words or sentences (e.g. Li, Pike and Haniffa, 
2008; Kothari, Xu and Short, 2009; Haniffa and Cooke, 2005), we use content analysis to 
measure the comprehensiveness and quality of disclosed information in banks’ annual 
reports. The rationale for this is that the quality of disclosure is more essential than the 
quantity (Hasseldine, Salama and Toms, 2005; Toms, 2002). In line with definitions, 
frameworks and methods employed in the mainstream CSR literature (Gray et al., 1995a, 
1995b; Haniffa and Cooke, 2005; Branco and Rodrigues, 2006; Scholtens, 2008; Holder-
Webb, Cohen, Nath and Wood, 2009), we develop a CSR disclosure measure based on the 
content of four CSR categories − community involvement, environment, employees, and 
product and customer service quality − and score the content of information in each of the 
categories based on the existence and comprehensiveness of information disclosed.  
Our findings suggest that board independence and board size positively affect CSR 
disclosure by large US banks. This indicates that, possibly due to the increasing realisation of 
the long-term benefits of CSR, corporate governance mechanisms that were chiefly designed 
to protect minority shareholder interests might also encourage managerial stewardship for the 
benefit of all stakeholders. However, contrary to our expectations, Chief Executive Officer 
(CEO) duality, also, appears to be positively related to CSR disclosure. We are unable to 
identify whether stakeholders benefit from the ability of powerful CEOs to pursue private 
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interests by engaging in CSR activities and CSR reporting, or whether the market pressures 
and public scrutiny force powerful CEOs to engage in CSR disclosure as a means of allaying 
fears that they might exploit their position. 
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. The next section provides a discussion 
of the relationship between corporate governance and CSR disclosure. This is followed by the 
hypotheses development. Afterwards, we discuss our research design, in terms of sample 
data, measurement of variables and the model, before we present the results and their 
analysis. The conclusion is given in the final section. 
2. Corporate Governance and CSR 
According to the World Bank, “corporate social responsibility is the commitment of 
businesses to contribute to sustainable economic development by working with employees, 
their families, the local community and society at large to improve their lives in ways that are 
good for business and for development” (Starks 2009, p. 465).  
CSR can have both financial and strategic advantages for firms. By engaging in social 
activities and reporting on CSR, firms develop the trust and goodwill of stakeholders, which 
can provide them with competitive advantages (Aguilera, Williams, Conley and Rupp, 2006; 
Money and Schepers, 2007; Gill, 2008; Kolk and Pinkse, 2010). Research suggests that CSR 
reporting promotes firms’ image and enhances their reputation (Gray et al., 1995b; Li et al., 
2010; Vanhamme, Lindgreen, Reast and van Popering, 2012) as relationships with 
stakeholders are based on a positive exchange of benefits (Bear, Rahman and Post, 2010). 
Socially responsible firms tend to experience greater brand loyalty (Mackenzie, 2007), 
customer satisfaction and employee commitment (Matten, 2006). CSR engagement also 
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reduces the risk that firms’ performance is negatively affected by labour disputes, product 
safety scandals and consumer fraud (Waddock and Graves, 1997). Accordingly, firms which 
are perceived to have high CSR standards are subject to lower firm specific risks due to lower 
cash flow variability (Salama et al., 2011). 
As CSR engagement and CSR reporting can impact on firms’ risks and profitability, 
investors increasingly consider firms’ social behaviour in their investment decisions 
(Simpson and Kohers, 2002; Aguilera et al., 2006; Matten, 2006). Research by Ghoul et al. 
(2011) on US firms indicates that investment in employee relations, environmental policies 
and CSR product strategies helps lower firms’ costs of capital. Investors, therefore, 
increasingly require boards and managers to engage in CSR and report on this engagement 
(Scholtens, 2008; Kolk and Pinkse, 2010). 
However, firms’ engagement in CSR is not merely of interest to long-term profit 
maximising shareholders. Firms’ dependence on other stakeholders and on the frameworks 
and resources provided by civil society means that there is a reciprocal expectation that firms 
“balance the multiplicity of stakeholder interests” and “are responsible to society as a whole” 
(van Marrewijk, 2003, pp. 96-97). Expectations about firms’ social responsibilities are, 
therefore, affected by their potential impact on stakeholders and civic society. This is one of 
the reasons why industries, which can impose significant negative external effects on society, 
such as the financial service sector, tend to be comparatively tightly regulated and 
scrutinised. The huge negative external effects failing banks in the US and Europe recently 
imposed on society are the driving force behind attempts by national and international 
regulators to improve banking standards and explain why the CSR activities of banks have 
come under increased public scrutiny (Grove et al., 2011).  
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While governments have the responsibility to set regulatory frameworks for the operation 
of firms at national and international level, it is the board of directors, which is ultimately 
responsible for the development of sustainable business strategies and the oversight of 
managers’ use of the firms’ resources (OECD, 1999). Both at national and at firm-level, 
“good corporate governance” is expected “to ensure that corporations take into account the 
interests of a wide range of constituencies, as well as of the communities within which they 
operate, and that their boards are accountable to the company and the shareholders” (OECD, 
1999, p. 5). However, with regard to firms’ engagement in CSR, there is so far little research 
into whether “good” corporate governance at board level has any impact (e.g. Jo and Harjoto, 
2011). This is of particular concern, given the potential conflicts of interest between 
shareholders, other stakeholders and the public at large. As most firm-level corporate 
governance mechanisms were originally developed to protect shareholder interests (Fama, 
1980), it is by no means a foregone conclusion that “good” corporate governance is also 
beneficial to the interests of other stakeholders and civic society. 
3. Hypotheses Development 
In situations where goods, labour and capital markets are not perfectly competitive, agency 
theory suggests that managers might be able and willing to abuse their power to exploit the 
firms’ shareholders as well as other stakeholders (Hermalin and Weisbach, 1998; Haniffa and 
Cooke, 2002). In such circumstances, when external corporate governance fails, internal 
corporate governance mechanisms, in particular boards of directors, are expected to play a 
key role in supervising managers and holding them to account (Fama, 1980; Hermalin and 
Weisbach, 2003; Li et al., 2008; Guest, 2009). While directors in non-financial companies are 
usually expected to oversee managers predominantly in the interest of shareholders, financial 
Corporate Governance and CSR Disclosure 
8 
 
services regulation extends the fiduciary duties of directors of banks to depositors and 
regulators (Pathan and Skully, 2010), although the election of the directors remains the 
purview of shareholders.  
The way that boards discharge their duty of supervision and control depends not only on 
their fiduciary duties but also on their membership and organisation. For example, Pathan’s 
(2009) research on large US bank holding companies indicates that between 1997 and 2004 
CEO power and board structure were related to banks’ risk taking. The findings do not only 
show that board characteristics, such as board independence and CEO duality, can impact on 
firm behaviour; they also demonstrate the importance of differences in stakeholder interests. 
The pre-credit crunch study indicates that strong, independent boards of directors 
successfully put pressure on banks’ management to increase risk taking for the short-term 
benefit of shareholders and the detriment of depositors, bondholders and risk-averse CEOs. 
By contrast, banks with strong CEOs tended to have a lower risk profile, as managers were 
able to accommodate their personal inclination for risk-aversion, which incidentally also 
benefitted other stakeholders such as depositors and bondholders.  
In the context of CSR disclosure, differences in interests of managers, shareholders and 
other stakeholders are also likely to play a role in how corporate governance structures affect 
firm behaviour. However, in this case, as discussed earlier, it appears that shareholders’ and 
other stakeholders’ interests might be more closely aligned.  
3.1 Board Independence 
From an agency theoretical perspective, boards with a high proportion of independent 
directors are presumed to be more effective in monitoring and controlling management. They 
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are, therefore, expected to be more successful in directing management towards long-term 
firm value enhancing activities and a high degree of transparency. Independent directors are 
supposed to be able to assess management performance more objectively than executive 
directors, as they are less closely involved in the development of firm strategies and business 
policies. In addition, independent directors are less dependent on the CEO’s goodwill than 
executive directors and affiliated non-executive directors with business links to the firm. 
Therefore, a higher proportion of independent directors on the board is expected to lead to 
better monitoring and control of management (John and Senbet, 1998; Ahmed, Hossain and 
Adam, 2006; Cheng and Courtenay, 2006). 
Moreover, independent non-executive directors’ remuneration is not tied to the firm’s 
financial performance and growth, unlike the remuneration of top executives and the business 
prospects of affiliated non-executive directors. Consequently, independent directors are 
expected to be less focussed on short-term financial performance targets and more interested 
in measures which enhance firms’ long-term sustainability, such as engaging in and reporting 
on CSR (Ibrahim, Howard and Angelidis, 2003). Banks with independent boards are, 
therefore, expected to display a greater engagement in CSR and CSR reporting (Jamali et al., 
2008; Arora and Dharwadkar, 2011). 
Indeed, empirical research suggests that independent directors are more supportive of 
firms’ investment in CSR activities (Johnson and Greening, 1999) and pay more attention to 
the perception of the firm’s social impact than executive or affiliated non-executive directors. 
Moreover, prior studies indicate that boards of directors with a high proportion of 
independent directors tend to facilitate a comparatively high degree of transparency and 
voluntary disclosure (Cheng and Courtenay, 2006; Patelli and Prencipe, 2007; Donnelly and 
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Mulcahy, 2008; Li et al., 2008; Chau and Gray 2010). This suggests that independent 
directors are likely to support the disclosure of CSR activities to reduce information 
asymmetry between insiders and outsiders. This leads to our first hypothesis. 
H1: A higher degree of board independence is positively related to CSR disclosure. 
3.2 Board Size 
Considering group dynamics, smaller boards are often expected to be more effective at 
monitoring and controlling management than larger boards. Due to their limited size, they are 
expected to benefit from more efficient communication and coordination as well as higher 
levels of commitment and accountability of individual board members (Ahmed et al., 2006; 
Dey, 2008).  
However, the drawback of small boards is that the workload of individual members tends 
to be high, which might limit the monitoring ability of the board (John and Senbet, 1998). 
Moreover, smaller boards can draw on a less diversified range of expertise than larger boards, 
which can impact on the quality of the advice and monitoring offered (Guest, 2009).  
Empirical research suggests that board size is determined by a variety of factors 
including industry, firm size and the complexity of the firm’s business (Krishnan and 
Visvanathan, 2009; Pathan, 2009). As commercial banks are complex organisations that are 
subject to wide-ranging regulation (Grove et al., 2011), we expect that in this context 
workload considerations are of ultimate importance. Hence, we expect that larger boards will 
be better able to direct management to engage in CSR activities and to effectively 
communicate their social performance to the bank’s stakeholders. This leads to our second 
hypothesis. 
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H2: Board size is positively related to CSR disclosure. 
3.3 CEO Duality 
Agency theory suggests that managers’ private interests are likely to impact on the degree to 
which they engage in CSR activities and CSR disclosure. In this context, CEO duality can be 
seen both as a sign and an instrument of managerial power. CEOs are more likely to be 
appointed as chairs of the boards of directors if they have a successful track record or if they 
control a large proportion of the firm’s shares (Hermalin and Weisbach, 1998). Moreover, as 
chairs of boards of directors have the ability to set the board’s agenda and influence the 
information provided to the other board members, CEOs who also act as chairs can hide 
crucial information more easily from other, in particular non-executive, directors (Haniffa 
and Cooke, 2002; Li et al., 2008; Krishnan and Visvanathan, 2009). Being chair might also 
enable CEOs to influence board appointments in their favour (Haniffa and Cooke, 2002). 
Therefore, non-executive directors might be more likely to accept managerial decisions 
against their better judgement, because they try to avoid confrontations with powerful CEOs, 
for example to retain their places on the board (Dey, 2008). Empirical research suggests that 
boards of directors’ attention to monitoring is negatively affected by CEO duality (Tuggle, 
Sirmon, Reutzel, and Bierman, 2010), as is the level of voluntary disclosure (Donnelly and 
Mulcahy, 2008; Chau and Gray, 2010). 
As previously discussed, while it is often assumed that bank CEOs are less risk happy 
than their diversified shareholders, changes in banks’ executive remuneration might have 
changed this. Empirical studies suggest that executive remuneration in US holding banks has 
become increasingly risk sensitive, which has encouraged managers to take more risks in 
order to maximise their short-term pay. Research by Bai and Elyasiani (2013) shows that 
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between 1992 and 2008 the risk sensitivity of CEO pay in US bank holding companies 
increased significantly and that this is related to an increase in bank risk. Similarly, research 
by Hagendorff and Vallascas (2011) find that between 1993 and 2007 CEOs of US banks 
increasingly engaged in risky business transactions, as the proportion of equity-based pay in 
their performance contracts rose. This suggests that managers’ typical inclination to limit 
their risk exposure to protect their human capital has been eroded by the structure of their 
executive pay packages. As CSR engagement and disclosure tend to reduce firms’ risk 
profiles (Simpson and Kohers, 2002; Scholtens, 2008; Salama et al., 2011; Ghoul et al., 
2011), CEOs might view CSR reporting as detrimental to maximising their remuneration. 
Moreover, if powerful CEOs are able to use CSR to further their own interests and moral 
convictions, rather than the interests of shareholders and other stakeholders, they are likely to 
be reluctant to provide comprehensive, high quality disclosure of CSR activities. Since the 
provision of information increases the effectiveness of external control not only by informed 
investors, financial analysts and the business press (Healy and Palepu, 2001; Li et al., 2008; 
Beyer, Cogen, Thomas and Walther 2010) but also by other key stakeholders and the public, 
powerful CEOs are expected to use their influence to curtail voluntary disclosure, including 
CSR disclosure. 
Given the development of executive remuneration in banks during the last 15 years and 
the ability of CEOs, who also act as chairs of the boards of directors, to influence board 
behaviour, we expect that: 
H3: CEO duality is negatively related to CSR disclosure. 
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4. Research Design 
4.1 Sample  
The paper seeks to investigate whether CSR reporting in annual reports of US listed national 
commercial banks is related to the firms’ corporate governance in the wake of the financial 
crisis of 2007−2008. We therefore examine the CSR disclosures in US national commercial 
banks’ annual reports from 2009−2011. In order to focus on financial institutions which 
provide similar services and are subject to the same regulations and disclosure requirements, 
we exclude credit unions, saving institutions and central reserve depositories from our 
considerations. This leaves us with a sample of 193 banks with total assets varying from $48 
million to $2,223 billion. To ensure that banks have a similar level of regulatory scrutiny and 
public visibility, we further refine our sample by excluding all banks which recorded less 
than $1 billion in total assets in 2009. The initial sample selected according to the defined 
criteria consisted of 107 US listed national commercial banks per-year. 
The CSR data was collected from banks’ 2009, 2010 and 2011 annual reports. The data 
on board composition and activity was also collected from the banks’ annual reports as well 
as related proxy statements. Financial data was collected from the Thomson One Banker 
database and, if necessary, from the banks’ 10-K forms and websites. If one or more of the 
variables were not found in the mentioned data sources, the corresponding bank was omitted 
from the sample. This left us with 98 observations for 2009, 97 observations for 2010 and 96 
observations for 2011. 
4.2 Measuring CSR Disclosure 
In line with previous research, this paper focuses on self-reported information on CSR 
provided by the firms in their annual reports (Gray et al., 1995b). The information contained 
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in the annual report is under much more control of the CEO and the board of directors, than 
information by the press or interest groups, which many CSR ratings agencies rely on 
(Johnson and Greening 1999; Barnea and Rubin, 2010; Bear et al., 2010; Jo and Harjoto, 
2011). This is important given our research questions. Moreover, compared with specialised 
CSR reports, annual reports tend to have a much wider readership among shareholders, 
stakeholders and information intermediaries, such as financial analysts and credit rating 
agencies. Finally, the majority of the content of annual reports tends to be audited, whereas 
auditing of CSR reports tends to be much more limited (Pflugrath, Roebuck and Simnett, 
2011; Perego and Kolk, 2012). This suggests that the CSR information provided in annual 
reports has a greater reliability than that published in CSR reports. 
Previous studies which aimed at evaluating CSR disclosure have tended to use two main 
approaches. The first is to use CSR ratings provided by CSR rating agencies (Johnson and 
Greening 1999; Barnea and Rubin, 2010; Bear et al., 2010). We reject this option as the 
underlying rationale for the ratings tends to remain obscure and the rating is not only affected 
by information disclosed by the firm. The second approach is to measure the disclosure 
content using word or page counts (Li et al., 2008; Kothari et al., 2009; Haniffa and Cooke, 
2005). However, such quantity scores say little about the quality and comprehensiveness of 
the disclosure (Hasseldine et al., 2005). If, as previously discussed, CEOs might be 
incentivized to use CSR disclosure to maximize media coverage while at the same time trying 
to limit stakeholder scrutiny of their policies, measuring the quality and comprehensiveness 
rather than the quantity of CSR disclosure is particularly important. 
Therefore, in line with the guidance provided by Gray et al. (1995a), we construct a CSR 
disclosure measure based on the definitions, frameworks and methods employed in the 
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mainstream CSR literature. We examine the content of four CSR categories: community 
involvement, environment, employees, and product and customer service quality (Gray et al., 
1995b; Haniffa and Cooke, 2005; Branco and Rodrigues, 2006; Scholtens, 2008; Holder-
Webb et al., 2009). 
The content of information on the four CSR categories is assessed using scores based on 
the existence and comprehensiveness of information disclosed in each category (see 
appendix). Each CSR category is rated from zero to three according to the richness of 
information disclosed. One additional point is given per category if quantitative figures are 
disclosed and another point if comparative figures are disclosed. Therefore, a maximum of 
five points can be assigned to each category and twenty points as a total score for CSR 
disclosure quality. The disclosure measure (CSRDS) is the ratio of points awarded over the 
maximum points a bank could achieve.  
CSRDS = ∑ points of (community, environment, employees and product & customer services 
categories) / 20 
The reliability and consistency of coding is crucial in the application of content analysis 
to ensure that the assigned scores are reproducible and reliable. Although reliability testing 
cannot provide full assurance of scoring objectivity (Linsley, Shrives and Crumpton, 2006), 
Kripendroff’s alpha is commonly used to assess the level of agreement between two or more 
coders (Newson and Deggan, 2002; Hasseldine et al., 2005; Holder-Webb et al., 2009). 
Previous studies tend to suggest that alpha values of 75% or above are considered generally 
acceptable (Hasseldine et al., 2005; Holder-Webb et al., 2009). 
To ensure the reliability of the assigned CSR disclosure scores, a randomly selected 
sample of twenty annual reports was selected. The corresponding annual reports were 
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provided to two independent coders. The coders were informed about the scoring procedure 
and were then required to assess the CSR content of the annual reports and allocate relevant 
scores. The scores provided by the two independent coders along with the score computed by 
one of the authors were used to test the scoring process reliability. The results of the test were 
satisfactory as the Krippendorff’s alpha for inter-coding agreement showed a value of 80%. 
4.3 Control Variables 
To avoid model misspecification, we control for additional variables, which might also 
impact on CSR disclosure. As CSR reporting is largely voluntary disclosure, we expect that 
corporate governance structures, which impact on the provision and quality of voluntary 
disclosure, will also affect CSR disclosure. In this context, agency theory suggests that 
effective audit committees are likely to improve the reliability of corporate reporting and 
thereby to reduce information asymmetry between management and outside investors and 
other stakeholders (McMullen, 1996). The effectiveness of audit committees is likely to 
depend on their size and expertise. Due to the scope and complexity of the tasks of audit 
committees, larger audit committees are expected to be more effective and to put more 
pressure on managers to disclose information voluntarily to increase transparency (Li et al., 
2008; Goh, 2009). This is especially relevant to banks, which conduct particularly complex 
and risky business operations (Laeven and Levine, 2009; Pathan, 2009). The literature on 
voluntary disclosure and disclosure quality also suggests that audit committee members with 
financial expertise tend to have a positive impact on the extent and reliability of corporate 
reporting (Bédard, Chtourou and Courteau, 2004; Karamanou and Vafeas, 2005; Hoitash and 
Hoitash, 2009). Although it appears unlikely that the understanding of audit committee 
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members of CSR related information is linked to their financial expertise, we suggest that 
such members might have a more positive attitude to information disclosure in general. 
According to Lee, Mande and Ortman (2004), the number of audit committee and board 
meetings might be a measure of diligence and, therefore, board and audit committee 
effectiveness. With regard to corporate reporting, Kent and Stewart’s (2008) research 
indicates that the frequency of board and audit committee meetings is positively related to 
voluntary disclosure. Thus we control for board and audit committee meeting frequency. 
Managers of firms which perform well financially might have spare resources under their 
control, which can be used to engage more actively in CSR and CSR reporting to placate 
stakeholders or pursue managerial interests. It is therefore essential to control for firms’ 
financial performance (Haniffa and Cooke, 2002, 2005; Lim, Matolcsy and Chow, 2007; 
Arora and Dharwadkar, 2011). 
The need of managers of highly leveraged firms to generate and retain cash to service the 
debt might reduce their ability to fund CSR and CSR reporting (Reverte, 2009; Barnea and 
Rubin, 2010). We therefore control for firm leverage. While empirical research by Haniffa 
and Cooke (2002, 2005) and Reverte (2009) has found no indication of a relationship 
between leverage and CSR disclosure, Barnea and Rubin’s (2010) research suggests a 
negative relationship between leverage and CSR disclosure.  
As managers might use CSR disclosure to impact on stakeholders’ perceptions of firm 
risk, we control for banks’ systematic risks. Prior empirical research indicates that firm risk 
tends to be positively related to CSR disclosure (Deegan and Gordon, 1996; Jo and Harjoto, 
2011). 
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Large firms have greater impact on communities than smaller firms. (Barnea and Rubin, 
2010). Consequently, large firms tend to be more exposed to the influence of powerful 
stakeholder groups representing employees, customers, investors, public authorities, etc., are 
likely to face tighter regulatory requirements, and tend to be subject to greater public scrutiny 
(Reverte, 2009; Barnea and Rubin, 2010)). Therefore, firm size is likely to influence the 
amount of CSR disclosure needed to address the concerns of various stakeholder groups 
(Branco and Rodrigues, 2006). As our sample consists of large US national commercial 
banks, the study uses a relative rather than absolute measure to control for bank size (De 
Haan and Poghosyan, 2012; Holder-Webb et al., 2009).  
4.4 The Model 
To test the hypotheses, the Model (1.2) is set out below. 
CSRDSt = α +β1BSt + β2BIt + β3DUALt + β4ACSt + β5ACFEt + β6BMt + β7ACMt + β8ROAt + 
β9Levt + β10SIZEt + β11BETAt + έ   
Where: 
CSRDS    corporate social responsibility disclosure score measured as the ratio of 
disclosure content points over the maximum score a bank can achieve. 
BS board size as measured by the number of board members. 
BI board independence, measured by the number of independent directors over 
the total number of board members. 
DUAL chair/CEO duality: 0 if the CEO is not acting as the chair of the board of 
directors; 1, otherwise. 
ACS audit committee size, measured by the number of members on the audit 
committee. 
ACFE audit committee financial expertise, measured by the number of financial 
experts on the audit committee. 
BM board meetings, measured by the number of board meetings per year. 
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ACM audit committee meetings, measured by the number of audit committee 
meetings per year. 
ROA profitability, measured by net income over total assets. 
LEV leverage, measured by total debt over assets. 
SIZE Bank’s size, measured by calculating the distance of each bank’s log total 
assets from the sample mean, scaled by the log total assets’ standard deviation. 
 
BETA Bank’s risk, measured by systematic risk. 
α              the intercept. 
β1…. βn    the regression coefficients. 
t    period indicator. 
έ              the error term. 
 
5. Results and Discussion  
5.1 Descriptive Statistics 
5.1.1 Corporate Social Responsibility Disclosures 
Banks disclose CSR with different intensity and vary in their focus between the four 
identified CSR categories. The percentage of banks that disclose CSR in their annual reports 
increases from 93% in 2009 to 97% in 2010 and 2011. The mean of the aggregate disclosure 
score is 4.47 points (i.e. a ratio measure of 0.22) and the standard deviation is 3.35. The 
highest CSR disclosure score is 16 points out of 20 (i.e. 0.8) across the four CSR categories. 
The majority of the examined banks’ annual reports (87%) disclosed information related 
to their staff. This is in line with Branco and Rodrigues’ (2006) contention that banks are 
particularly motivated to disclose CSR information in relation to employees, since they are 
essential assets for banks and impact on investors’ assessment of the firms.  
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Forty-seven percent (47%) of the examined annual reports disclosed information related 
to community involvement. A similar proportion of annual reports (44%) disclosed 
information on social products, service quality and customer satisfaction. Only twelve 
percent (12%) of the annual reports examined disclosed information related to environmental 
projects and initiatives. Table 1 summarises the descriptive statistics for the CSR disclosures.  
[Table 1 about here] 
Between 2009 and 2010, we found a slight increase in the disclosure of CSR relevant 
content in the annual reports, as well as a rise in the number of banks that disclosed CSR 
related information in their annual reports. However, both disclosure levels and the number 
of banks disclosing CSR related information remained largely the same between 2010 and 
2011. 
5.1.2 Corporate Governance Variables  
The proportion of independent directors on the boards of the banks in our sample varies 
between 50% and 94% with a mean of 81%. This finding is comparable to that by Pathan and 
Skully (2010), which suggests that between 1997 and 2004 the proportion of independent 
directors on the boards of US bank holding companies ranged from 10% to 96.55%, with a 
mean of 64.55%. The main reason for these differences is probably the increased regulatory 
pressure on listed companies to improve board independence. For example, from 2004 
onwards, changes to Section 303A of the NYSE’s Listed Company Manual, meant that most 
listed companies were required to have a majority of independent directors on their boards.i 
In 32% of our observations there is only one executive director on the board. 
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The boards of national US banks, which are regulated and supervised by the Office of the 
Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), have to consist of between five and twenty-five 
directors. Our sample suggests that the board size actually varies between five and twenty-
one members. With 12.5 the mean of the board size in 2009 is similar that in 2010 (12.29) 
and 2011 (12). This is in line with research by Pathan and Skully (2010) who find that 
between 1997 to 2004 boards of US bank holding companies had 5 to 31 directors with a 
mean of 12.92. The lower maximum number of directors on bank boards compared to Pathan 
and Skully (2010) might partially be explained by differences between the samples, as bank 
holding companies are not subject to OCC regulations, and might also confirm their 
observation that the board size of medium and large banks is declining over time (Linck, 
Netter and Yang, 2008; Pathan and Skully, 2010).  
The third board characteristic examined is CEO duality. In 43% of the examined banks 
the CEO also holds the position of the chairman of the board. This compares to 58% in 
Pathan and Skully’s (2010) sample. As boards tend to be put under pressure by shareholders 
to abandon CEO duality if firm performance is poor (Hermalin and Weisbach, 1998; Linck et 
al., 2008), the fall in CEO duality might be related to the poor bank performance during and 
after the US sub-prime mortgage crisis. Table 2 summarises the descriptive statistics of the 
control variables. 
[Table 2 about here] 
5.2 Data Analysis 
The descriptive statistics show that CSR disclosure scores range from zero to 0.8, with a 
mean of 0.22. Five percent of observations did not disclose CSR related information and 
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therefore score zero. As our dependent variable is censored, we apply TOBIT regression 
models in the first instance ii. The TOBIT regression model (Tobin, 1958) is commonly used 
in studying cases of censored data. If the values of the dependent variable in some of the 
observations are grouped at a limiting amount, which is commonly zero, TOBIT regressions 
becomes more powerful than other regressions since they make use of all observations 
regardless of whether they are at the limit or above. This distinguishes the TOBIT regression 
from other regressions that estimate the best fit only based on values which lie above the limit 
(McDonald and Moffitt, 1980). 
The TOBIT model equation is formed as follows: 
yt = Xtβ + ut                if Xtβ + ut > 0 
          = 0                   if Xtβ + ut ≤ 0 
                              t = 1, 2,…., N 
 
Where N denotes the number of observations, yt denotes the dependent variable at time t, 
Xt denotes the independent variables at time t, β are the coefficients and ut represents the error 
term (McDonald and Moffitt, 1980). 
We use a Spearman correlations matrix and VIF-tests to test for the existence of multi-
collinearity between the examined independent variables. Table 3 shows the correlations 
between the independent variables. The results do not indicate any serious collinearity in the 
examined models. We test for heteroscedasticity using White’s test. The results do not 
suggest a threat of heteroscedasticity.  
[Table 3 about here] 
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The analysis of the impact of corporate governance on banks’ CSR disclosure for the 
three-year period is conducted using two models, in order to isolate any potential effects of 
audit committee characteristics on voluntary disclosure. The results of the regressions are 
interpreted and reconciled below. Table 4 below shows estimates for two TOBIT models 
(1.1. and 1.2).  
[Table 4 about here] 
All of the key corporate governance variables, board independence, board size and CEO 
duality, are statistically significant in each of the regressions. While the explanatory power of 
the model increases when audit committee characteristics are added to the model, the results 
for the board characteristics remain consistent. 
Our results, therefore, support hypothesis 1, which expected board independence to be 
positively related to CSR disclosure. This is in line with previous research into independent 
directors’ attitude towards CSR activities (Johnson and Greening 1999; Ibrahim et al., 2003) 
and independent directors’ influence on transparency and voluntary disclosure (Cheng and 
Courtenay, 2006; Patelli and Prencipe, 2007; Donnelly and Mulcahy, 2008; Li et al., 2008; 
Chau and Gray, 2010). These findings indicate that independent directors promote both 
shareholders’ and other stakeholders’ interests with regard to CSR disclosure.  
Hypothesis 2, which predicted that firms with larger boards are likely to disclose more 
CSR related information, is also supported. Our findings are in line with previous research 
into the relationship between board size and voluntary disclosure (e.g. Lim et al., 2007; 
Donnelly and Mulcahy, 2008). The results indicate that, possibly because banks are complex 
organisations, having a larger number of directors share the work has a positive impact on the 
firm’s attitude towards its stakeholders.  
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Hypothesis 3, which expected CEO duality to be negatively related to CSR disclosure, is 
not supported. To the contrary, in line with findings by Bear et al. (2010), our results 
consistently suggest a statistically significant positive relationship between CEO duality and 
CSR disclosure. One possible explanation might be that more powerful CEOs promote CSR 
and CSR disclosure in order to become more successful and to increase their pay or tenure 
prospects, to appease personal moral concerns, or to reduce the supervision and control 
exerted by financial or goods markets, the board of directors or regulators (Barnea and Rubin 
2010). For example, Jiraporn and Chintrakarn (2013) suggest that CEOs view CSR 
opportunistically to gain media coverage and enhance their own reputation. Using CEO pay 
as a measure for CEO power, their research suggests that, unless CEOs are already firmly 
entrenched, more powerful CEOs are likely to engage more actively in CSR. Moreover, as 
previously discussed, particularly in the context of banks, powerful CEOs might have an 
incentive to limit their firm’s risk exposure against the interests of short-term oriented 
shareholders (Laeven and Levine, 2009; Barry, Lepetit and Tarazi, 2011) in order to improve 
their job security and to protect their human capital (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Pathan, 2009). 
As banks’ risk exposure can not only be reduced via finance and investment strategies 
(Pathan, 2009), but also via CSR activities aimed at engaging key stakeholders (Gill, 2008; 
Scholtens, 2008; Kolk and Pinkse, 2010; Ghoul et al., 2011; Salama et al., 2011), powerful 
CEOs might have an interest to increase the bank’s CSR activities and reporting. 
Another explanation why powerful CEOs might pursue a high degree of engagement 
with and disclosure of CSR might be related to the increased scrutiny they are exposed to. If 
goods, labour and capital markets are competitive, agency theory suggests that firms’ 
corporate governance mechanisms might be endogenously determined (Fama, 1980; 
Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003). This implies that, if investors and other stakeholders are 
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aware of a CEO’s powerful position, they may demand additional safeguards to reduce the 
risk that managers abuse their power. In this context firms with CEO duality might use CSR 
disclosure to improve the effectiveness of outside control by informed investors, financial 
analysts, the business press etc. (Healy and Palepu, 2001; Li et al., 2008; Beyer et al., 2010), 
or to signal high ethical standards and good faith to their stakeholders (Gray et al., 1995b; 
Meek, Roberts and Gray, 1995; Aguilera et al., 2006; Money and Schepers, 2007; Kolk and 
Pinkse, 2010).  
While one might argue that in either case, stakeholders stand to benefit from CEO duality 
with regards to CSR disclosure, as the rationale for the disclosure is fundamentally different, 
it would be important to know whether the influence of powerful CEOs on CSR disclosure is 
driven by personal interests, by risk management considerations, or by competitive and 
public pressure. As we measure not simply the quantity of CSR disclosure but its quality and 
comprehensiveness, and as our models control for firm risk, our findings most plausibly point 
towards the latter option. This could be related to the increasing pressure on banks since the 
sub-prime mortgage crisis by investors, regulators and the public to pay more attention to the 
long-term sustainability of the business and to respond to their obligations to society (Matten, 
2006; Money and Schepers, 2007; Gill, 2008; Grove, et al., 2011). However, as our data does 
not allow us to develop a definitive answer to the question, it would be worthwhile in the 
future to explore this issue explicitly. 
With regard to the other control variables, we found that board meeting frequency and 
audit committee meeting frequency are statistically significantly related to CSR disclosure. 
This is in line with findings by Kent and Stewart (2008) which suggest a positive relationship 
between the number of board meetings and the level of disclosed information. The number of 
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board and audit committee meetings appears to be a good proxy for the diligence and effort 
of the relevant board members (Lee et al., 2004), which has a positive impact on firms’ CSR 
reporting. 
Our research also indicates that ROA is statistically significantly related to CSR 
disclosure. This is in line with findings by Johnson and Greening (1999), Simpson and 
Kohers (2002), Haniffa and Cooke (2005), Scholtens (2008), as well as Li et al. (2010), 
which suggest that firms with a better financial performance are more capable to invest in 
social activities than firms suffering from poor returns. In line with the expectation that 
managers of comparatively risky businesses might use CSR disclosure to mitigate 
stakeholders’ risk perceptions (Deegan and Gordon, 1996; Jo and Harjoto, 2011), we find 
beta to be positively statistically significantly related to CSR disclosure. Leverage does not 
appear to be significantly related to CSR disclosure. This is in line with similar findings by 
Haniffa and Cooke (2005) and Reverte (2009).  
5.3 Sensitivity Testing 
To check the robustness of the estimated relationships between corporate governance and 
CSR disclosure, another set of regressions is conducted using the fixed effect panel linear 
regression with robust standard errors (see Table 4, models 2.1. and 2.2.). In line with our 
earlier results, board independence, board size, CEO duality, audit committee financial 
expertise, board and audit committee meeting frequency and ROA are all statistically 
significantly and positively related to CSR disclosure. Firm risk, however, is only statistically 
significantly related to CSR disclosure in the full model, which takes account of board and 
audit committee characteristics.  
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As reverse causality might be a challenge to our analysis, we run a chi-square test to establish 
whether the CSR disclosure score and ROA are interdependent. The chi-square test reports a 
significance of 0.969, indicating that reverse causality between ROA and CSR is unlikely. 
Nevertheless, we re-ran the TOBIT regression, replacing ROA by one-year lagged ROA. The 
results were consistent with the original regression. 
6. Conclusion  
Prior research into the relationship between corporate governance and CSR is limited almost 
exclusively to the investigation of the impact on CSR committees on CSR activities and CSR 
disclosure (Li et al., 2010; Kolk and Pinkse, 2010; Spitzeck, 2009; Gill, 2008). The lack of 
research into the impact of firms’ other corporate governance structures on CSR reporting is 
an indication of a mental disconnect between what is considered to be “good corporate 
governance” and how to ensure that firms transparently fulfil their social obligations to 
society.  
Even if CSR reporting would be considered merely as a means to develop better long-
term, mutually beneficial relationships with key stakeholders (Gray et al., 1995b; Meek et al., 
1995; Aguilera et al., 2006; Money and Schepers, 2007; Kolk and Pinkse, 2010), the 
economic value of the related benefits suggests that firms’ corporate governance structures 
should have a bearing on it. Moreover, given the potential impact of firms on a wide range of 
direct and indirect stakeholders, it is of interest to investigate whether board features which 
were designed to facilitate corporate governance in the interest of equity investors can also be 
effective in promoting firms’ engagement with their wider social responsibilities. This 
Corporate Governance and CSR Disclosure 
28 
 
appears to be particularly relevant in the context of large banks, due to their ability to impose 
significant negative external effects on society.  
Examining the CSR disclosure in annual reports of a sample of large national US 
commercial banks using content analysis, our findings suggest that key characteristics of the 
board of directors are significantly associated with CSR disclosure. In particular, our research 
indicates that board independence and board size are positively and significantly related to 
CSR disclosure by US banks. These findings highlight that effectively designed boards (Gray 
et al., 1995b; Ibrahim et al., 2003; Lee et al., 2004; Guest, 2009) can contribute to 
safeguarding the interests of all stakeholders, and not merely the shareholders who appoint 
them. This highlights the need for stakeholders and their representatives to take a much closer 
interest in corporate governance mechanisms which are likely to affect the effectiveness of 
the board of directors and not to limit their concerns to directly CSR related corporate 
governance features, such as CSR committees. 
Our findings also suggest that CEO duality is positively and significantly related to CSR 
disclosure by US banks. However, we are unable to establish the reasons for this positive 
relationship. It would be helpful if future research would explore whether this positive 
relationship is determined by the competitiveness of relevant goods, labour and capital 
markets (Fama, 1980; Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003) in the banking sector, and therefore an 
indication of the effectiveness of a self-regulating system of corporate governance, or 
whether it is a sign of managerial risk aversion (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Laeven and Levine, 
2009; Pathan, 2009; Barnea and Rubin, 2010; Barry et al., 2011). 
In order to gain a better understanding of the circumstances in which corporate 
governance mechanisms designed to protect shareholders can be helpful or harmful to the 
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protection of the interests of other stakeholders, it would be beneficial to explore the 
relationship between corporate governance and CSR disclosure in a much wider range of 
industries and countries, with different levels of public scrutiny, regulation and competitive 
pressures. 
While our research does not provide any evidence for a significant change in CSR 
disclosure by US commercial banks between 2009 and 2011, it might further be of interest to 
explore in future, how CSR disclosure and corporate governance of US commercial banks 
has developed over a longer time horizon, possibly including the period before the sub-prime 
mortgage crisis.  
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Appendix  
CSR Categories and Sub-categories 
 CSR category CSR sub-category 
1 
Community 
involvement  
 Contributions and donations to charities, NGOs and community activities 
 Provision if support to students to continue their education and 
sponsoring sport activities 
 Sponsoring health programmes 
 Sponsoring arts and culture  
 Supporting sports and/or recreational projects 
 Participation in social government campaigns 
2 Environment 
 Bank’s environmental policies and concerns   
 Implemented systems for environmental management  
 Environmental projects such as recycling and protection of natural 
resources  
 Energy saving in performing business operations  
3 Employees 
 Number of employees; health and safety policies and measures. 
 Equal opportunities in employment (e.g. minorities, women)  
 Training and education provided to employees (training policies and 
nature of training) 
 Employee assistance/benefits   
 Employee compensation  
 Employee expertise and backgrounds   
 Employee share purchase schemes  
 The confidence and self-esteem of employees  
 Employees’ appreciation 
 Issues related to the recruitment process 
 Photos to document employee welfare (e.g. at social activities, award 
ceremonies) 
 Discussion of employees’ welfare 
 Policies adopted regarding staff profit sharing  
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 CSR category CSR sub-category 
4 
Social products and 
services quality 
 Diversity of social products (e.g. climate products, educational loans 
etc.) 
 Discussion of the types of social products  
 Geographical distribution and marketing network of the offered social 
products 
 Discussions in relation to customers feedback  
 Provision for disabled, frail and difficult-to-reach customers  
 Investments in social responsibility activities 
 Strategies and plans for future expansion in social products and services 
 Loyalty programmes and gifts to customers  
Source: Based on categories identified by Gray et al., 1995b; Haniffa and Cooke, 2005; Branco and Rodrigues, 
2006; Scholtens, 2008; Holder-Webb et al., 2009. 
 
Notes 
i See: Securities Exchange Act Release No. 48745 (November 4, 2003); 68 FR 64154 
(November 12, 2003) (SR-NYSE-2002-33). 
ii We also employ OLS regressions with robust standard errors to test the sensitivity of the 
estimated regression results.  
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TABLE 1 
Summary CSR Descriptive Statistics  
Description 
Total 
CSR 
Disclosure 
Community 
Involvement  
Environment Employees 
Product & 
Customer 
Services  
Percent of total 
sample (295) 
95% 47% 12% 87% 44% 
Maximum 
disclosure score* 
16 
(0.8) 
5 5 5 5 
Minimum 
disclosure score* 
0 
(0.0) 
0 0 0 0 
Mode* 2 
(0.10) 
0 0 0 2 
Mean* 4.47 
(0.22) 
1.30 0.80 0.28 2.08 
SD* 3.35 
(0.17) 
1.64 1.13 0.88 1.14 
* data of the disclosure ratio in brackets 
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TABLE 2 
Summary Descriptive Statistics for Control Variables 
 
B
S
 
B
I 
D
U
A
L
 
B
M
 
A
C
S
 
A
C
F
E
 
A
C
M
 
R
O
A
 
L
E
V
 
S
IZ
E
 
B
E
T
A
 
Mean 12.4 0.81 0.43 10.96 4.49 1.78 8.44 -0.11 0.90 
0.86 -0.30 
Median 12 0.82 0 11 4 1 8 0.52 0.90 
0.79 -0.015 
SD 3.1 0.10 0.50 4.96 1.17 1.26 3.53 1.74 0.06 
0.54 3.92 
Skewness 0.29 -0.83 0.28 1.57 1.03 1.42 0.57 -2.14 -10.27 
2.20 -0.06 
Kurtosis 2.97 2.99 1.08 7.43 4.12 5.25 2.56 8.06 151.49 
9.69 8.61 
Minimum 5 0.50 0 4 3 0 3 -9.53 0.8 
0 -15.61 
Maximum 21 0.94 1 34 9 7 21 3.69 1.05 3.47 19.79 
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TABLE 3 
Spearman Correlations Matrix 
Variables VIF BS BI DUAL BM ACS ACM ACFE ROA  LEV SIZE BETA 
BS 1.27 1.00        
 
  
BI 1.13 -0.00 1.00       
 
  
DUAL 1.10 0.10 -0.00 1.00      
 
  
BM 1.28 -0.16 0.01 -0.23 1.00     
 
  
ACS 1.29 0.39 0.32 0.11 -0.07 1.00    
 
  
ACM 1.08 0.15 0.07 0.01 0.18 0.10 1.00   
 
  
ACFE 1.13 0.16 -0.01 0.10 0.10 0.05 0.19 1.00  
 
  
ROA 1.18 0.03 0.13 0.010 -0.24 0.07 -0.05 -0.04 1.00 
 
  
LEV 1.08 -0.14 -0.26 -0.04 0.012 -0.14 -0.21 -0.01 -0.23 1.00 
  
SIZE 1.44 -0.19 0.04 -0.09 0.03 -0.06 -0.10 -0.10 0.16 0.04 1.00  
BETA 1.21 -0.07 0.04 0.04 0.15 -0.11 0.03 -0.04 -0.22 0.30 -0.38 1.00 
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TABLE 4 
The Relationship between Governance Structure and CSR Disclosure  
 
Model (1.1) 
TOBIT 
Regression 
Board structure 
Model (1.2) 
TOBIT 
Regression 
Full model 
Model 
(2.1) 
Linear 
Panel 
regression 
Board 
structure  
Model 
(2.2) 
Linear 
Panel 
regression 
Full 
model 
Independent variables 
Coeff. 
p-value 
Coeff. 
p-value 
Coeff. 
p-value 
Coeff. 
p-value 
Constant -0.30 
(0.116) 
-0.32* 
(0.088) 
-0.34* 
(0.055) 
-0.34** 
(0.046) 
BS 0.013*** 
(0.000) 
0.012*** 
(0.001) 
0.011* 
(0.067) 
0.01* 
(0.072) 
BI 0.26*** 
(0.010) 
0.27*** 
(0.009) 
0.23** 
(0.022) 
0.25** 
(0.035) 
DUAL 0.06*** 
(0.004) 
0.05*** 
(0.006) 
0.06* 
(0.058) 
0.056** 
(0.045) 
BM 0.01*** 
(0.000) 
0.006** 
(0.006) 
0.01** 
(0.017) 
0.006*** 
(0.024) 
ACS  -0.012 
(0.197) 
 -0.01 
(0.189) 
ACFE  0.02** 
(0.026) 
 0.017** 
(0.002) 
ACM  0.01*** 
(0.004) 
 0.01* 
(0.087) 
ROA 0.023*** 
(0.000) 
0.022*** 
(0.000) 
0.022** 
(0.032) 
0.02** 
(0.033) 
LEV 0.012 
(0.945) 
0.02 
(0.915) 
0.08 
(0.486) 
0.075 
(0.418) 
SIZE 0.040** 
(0.036) 
0.035* 
(0.060) 
0.055 
(0.516) 
0.048 
(0.479) 
BETA 0.006* 
(0.039) 
0.006** 
(0.022) 
0.004 
(0.120) 
0.005** 
(0.048) 
Chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Wald Chi2 / R2 56.45 76.33 0.17 0.22 
*P < 0.1, **P < 0.05, ***P < 0.01; p-values in brackets. 
